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CIVIL RIGHTS IN EMPLOYMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS*
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) I made discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin illegal.
It also established an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) with power to issue interpretive regulations and to hear dis-
crimination complaints. During the last 12 years an extensive case law
has been generated by the EEOC and the courts delineating the types
of practices which the law forbids.
With the increase in the number and size of American-based
multinational enterprises (MNEs) 2 in recent years, the issue has arisen
as to whether the CRA has any application outside the territorial United
States. Several other factors have served to intensify the importance of
this problem such as the reappearance of the Arab boycott, statements
at presidential press conferences, and letters to the Attorney General by
several members of Congress.3
Clearly, there are important implications which would flow from the
enforcement of the CRA against American employers abroad. At the
very least, enforcing the CRA would change the way some American
corporations do business abroad. American-based multinationals might
* This Note was selected by the Cornell Law School faculty International Legal Studies
Committee as a co-recipient of the 1976 Henry White Edgerton Prize in international law.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as CRA].
Only Title VII of this Act deals directly with private employment, the subject of this Note.
2. There are acute problems in defining what is meant by the term "multinational
enterprise," particularly in a legal context. These problems have given rise to much debate
as to the meaning of the term. The term will be used here to refer to large organizations
with significant and growing international involvement. They.may encompass one or more
corporations and need not have strong centralized management. This is an approximation
of the definition used in Boddewyn & Kapoor, The External Relations of American Mul-
tinational Enterprises, in MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND WORLD ORDER 31 (G. Model-
ski ed. 1972). For a discussion of this definitional problem, see R. TINDALL, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (1975); Bauer, The Indefinitely Defined Multinational, 12 CONF. BD. REc. 21
(1975).
3. Statement by President Gerald R. Ford, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1975, at 1; Letter to
Attorney General Edward Levi from Congressmen Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., John J. McFall,
Morris Udall, Sidney R. Yates, John J. Rhodes, John B. Anderson, Edward P. Boland,
and Elizabeth Holtzman, Mar. 4, 1975.
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be placed at a competitive disadvantage in world markets, recruitment
and promotion strategies at home could be affected, and corporate in-
vestment decisions concerning whether to "base" the MNE outside the
United States might change. The effect on the domestic economy of any
large scale emigration of capital caused by companies establishing their
base of operations elsewhere would, of course, be disastrous. Soley
because of the immense volume of business conducted by American
MNEs, any policy determination with such uniform application would
undoubtedly have serious foreign policy consequences. The analysis of
whether the CRA has any extraterritorial application must reflect a
sensitivity to these considerations.
A. HISTORY LEADING UP TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The CRA was the result of many earlier attempts to enact a compre-
hensive anti-discrimination statute, and many of the CRA's provisions
are directly traceable to earlier drafts of the legislation. The first efforts
occurred during World War II when several executive orders were pro-
mulgated banning discrimination "to encourage full participation in the
national defense program."4 These early executive orders each created
a Fair Employment Practices Committee whose job it was to hear com-
plaints and recommend remedial action. In addition to having a very
limited number of staff employees and no enforcement powers, these
early "FEP" Committees were limited in their jurisdiction to govern-
ment employment and government contract employment. Not until
1961, under the Kennedy Administration, did such a committee have
remedial powers of its own.' This committee, called the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, was given power to
issue regulations, require compliance, and to hold hearings on individ-
ual complaints. The Kennedy Executive Order also required all govern-
ment contracts to include a provision that contractors take affirmative
action to ensure that applicants are employed and employees are treated
without regard to "race, creed, color, or national origin.",
4. Exec. Order No. 8,802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1943); Exec. Order No. 9,346, 3 C.F.R. 1280
(1943).
5. Neither the Truman nor the Eisenhower Executive Orders gave any effective power
to the committees. Their functions were primarily to evaluate the government's anti-
discrimination program and to issue reports to the President. See Exec. Order No. 10,308,
3 C.F.R. 837 (1951); Exec. Order No. 10,479, 3 C.F.R. 961 (1953); Exec. Order No. 10,925,
3 C.F.R. 448 (1963).
6. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1963).
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Early efforts to enact an anti-discrimination statute were aimed at
protecting government employees.' Beginning in 1943, bills were intro-
duced in every Congress to ban discrimination.' Not until 1950, how-
ever, did either house pass one of these proposals.' The employment
provisions of the bill which eventually was enacted, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, contain many similarities to these earlier proposals,
particularly to an earlier bill of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell and
to the Kennedy Executive Order.10
B. THE EEOC AND CASE INTERPRETATION
The agency charged with enforcing the CRA as amended is the five-
member presidentially appointd EEOC." The Commission is responsi-
ble for receiving complaints of employment discrimination, attempting
by informal methods to reconcile the parties, making findings of fact,
issuing remedial orders, and either authorizing the complaining party
to seek enforcement within a set time period or seeking enforcement of
those orders itself in federal district court." The EEOC also issues regu-
lations and "guidelines" interpreting the provisions of the CRA.'3
A court, upon finding illegal discrimination, has several remedial
powers available, including the issuance of orders enjoining the respon-
dent from engaging in the unlawful employment practice and orders
requiring such affirmative action as the court may direct. 4 As inter-
preted by the EEOC, "affirmative action" is a process of setting and
striving for numerical goals of minority groups and females in recruit-
ment, hiring, and promotion in order to increase their representation in
7. Unemployment Relief Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 5, ch. 17, 48 Stat. 22 (repealed by
Congress in 1970).
8. The first such legislation was introduced by New York Congressman Vito Marcanto-
nio of the American Labor Party. H.R. 1732, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). See generally
EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
9. The bill which did pass was a watered-down version of one introduced by Congress-
man Adam Clayton Powell. His "Fair Employment Practices Act," H.R. 4453, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949) [hereinafter cited as the Powell Bill] was replaced by a substitute offered
by Congressman Samuel K. McConnell on the floor of the House, after having been voted
out favorably by the Committee on Education and Labor. H.R. REP. No. 1165, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949), substituted on Feb. 23, 1950.
10. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See notes 6 & 9 supra.
11. The CRA has been amended several times since it was originally enacted. See
generally Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103;
Pub. L. No. 93-608, 88 Stat. 7972 (1975).
12. CRA § 706.
13. CRA § 713.
14. CRA § 706(g).
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a given work force. Affirmative action may be required of an employer
under certain circumstances even in the absence of proof that some
protected group has been traditionally excluded.' 5
The case law in this area is fairly well developed and reveals some of
the key concepts which will have to be re-analyzed if the CRA is found
applicable to the international setting. The EEOC and the federal
courts have not, for example, interpreted the CRA as forbidding per se
all distinctions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. The CRA explicitly recognizes that employment decisions may
occasionally have to be based on a candidate's religion, sex, or national
origin, where one of those characteristics constitutes a "bona fide
occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." 6 The standards for
what constitutes a so-called BFOQ, however, are very stringent. The
major case interpreting the BFOQ clause, Diaz v. Pan American World
Airways,"' involved a man claiming to have been discriminated against
on the basis of sex because of Pan Am's policy of hiring only female
stewardesses. The airline argued that sex was a BFOQ for the position
of "flight attendant" because of customer preferences and because of an
alleged superior ability of women to perform the "non-mechanical as-
pects of the job." The court held for the plaintiff attendant, however. It
said that while a male steward is perhaps not as soothing on a flight as
a female stewardess, a BFOQ could be found only if the discrimination
was a fulfillment of a "business necessity," not a mere "business con-
venience."' 8 The argument of "customer preference" was similarly
found insufficient:
Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant
to overcome. Thus, we feel that customer preference may be taken into
account only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the
primary function or service it offers."
The other major case interpreting the CRA was Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., in which a group of black employees of the Duke Power Company
challenged the requirement that an applicant for certain manual labor
15. CCH EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 3351 (1976).
16. CRA § 703(e). [This kind of exception will hereinafter be cited as a "BFOQ."].
17. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
18. Id. at 387-88.
19. Id. at 389.
20. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Other major cases interpreting the CRA include: Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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jobs had to either pass an intelligence test or possess a high school
diploma. The Supreme Court observed that as a consequence of these
job requirements, a disproportionate number of blacks were excluded
from being hired or promoted. Relying on the EEOC's guidelines, that
only through use of tests shown to be "job-related"'" can employment
screening be performed consistently with the CRA, the Court struck
down the Griggs employment requirements. The fact that the employer
had "good intent" was of no avail in the face of "employment procedures
or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."2 The actual
discriminatory impact of the test required that the employer carry a
burden of showing the test to be necessary to the primary functioning
of the enterprise. The Court stated that the Act forbids both overt
discrimination and seemingly neutral practices which are discrimina-
tory in their operation. As the Court said:
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job per-
formance, the practice is prohibited.23
The issues at the heart of cases like Diaz and Griggs become not only
domestic problems but international ones as well if the CRA is applied
overseas. If the Civil Rights Act is brought to bear on the employment
policies of multinational enterprises, among the first questions asked
will be whether customer preference in the international setting carries
any more weight than it does domestically. Clearly, the extraterritorial
situation is qualitatively different than the purely domestic one because
in the former setting the customer usually will have recourse to an alien
competitor's service which is not regulated by the CRA or equivalent
statutes. In addition, the courts will have to resolve the question of
whether neutral screening devices, such as employee eligibility to obtain
certain foreign visas, are founded upon business necessity of sufficient
import to be declared within the ambit of BFOQ. These questions only
hint at the changes in business operations foreign application of the
CRA may provoke.
21. Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1971).
22. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
23. Id. at 431.
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II
.CIVIL RIGHTS ACT JURISDICTION
A. LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
The Supreme Court has said that whether or not a statute has extra-
territorial application turns on Congressional intent. 4 In the case of
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,5 for exam-
ple, the Court was asked to determine whether the National Labor
Relations Act26 applied outside the territorial United States to foreign
flag vessels beneficially owned by United States corporations.Y The
Court reaffirmed its earlier position that "for us to sanction the exercise
of local sovereignty under such conditions in this 'delicate field of inter-
national relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed." 8 In the absence of any such expression in
the Act, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Board was
without jurisdiction to order an election on board the "foreign" vessel
docked at an American port. "In fact," said the Court, "we conclude
here that the arguments should be directed to the Congress rather than
to us. 2 19 By the same token, the applicability of the CRA abroad turns
on whether there is any evidence of such a Congressional intention in
the statute.
As noted earlier, the general rule of the CRA prohibits any covered
employer from discriminating against an individual because of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."3 Not all employers, however, are
"covered employers." Some are excluded because they are too small
while others are excluded because they do not affect interstate com-
merce.
The CRA definition of "employer" states:
"[Elmployer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has fifteen or more employees .. and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corpora-
24. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94 (1922); United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914).
25. 372 U.S. 10 (1963). The Court in McCulloch had combined three cases for joint
consideration.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
27. See Comment, Foreign Flag Ships in American Ports: The Question of NLRB
Jurisdiction, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 50 (1975).
28. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963).
29. Id. at 22.
30. CRA § 703.
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tion wholly owned by the Government of the United States. . . or (2) a
bona fide private membership club .... 31
The CRA definition of the term "employer" was carefully drafted so
as to encompass an increasing number of employers over time. The
minimum number of employees necessary for an employer to be covered
under the Act was initially programmed to be reduced in steps over a
four-year period, meaning that only the very largest employers have
been covered from the CRA's outset.32 If the Act does apply to American
employers abroad, this initially staggered application may have an ef-
fect on the extent of remedial action necessary.
3
It is unclear from the debate whether the "employees" referred to in
the above definition include those outside the United States. Partici-
pants in the original debate about which employers should be covered
by the Act made frequent reference to the disproportionate unemploy-
ment rates between blacks and whites "in all regions of the country.''"
Similarly, the House Judiciary Committee's report accompanying the
CRA bill made several references to problems of employment
discrimination "in various parts of the country."35 These statements
seem to indicate that in counting the requisite number of employees,
Congress did not intend to include foreign employees. Since haphazard
comments in the course of debate cannot be imbued with meaning be-
31. CRA § 701(b).
32. The bill reported to the House floor provided that the term "employer" would not
include persons with less than 100 employees during the first year of the Act, 50 during
the second year, and 25 thereafter. An intermediate step of 75 employees the second year
was added on the House floor. This was the only change in the definition of "employer"
adopted on the floor of either house. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1001.
33. See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1001-02; STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, CIVIL RIGHTS, Part II, 1291 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as STATUTORY
HISTORY].
34. See, e.g., STATUTORY HISTORY 1224 (Sen. Hubert Humphrey), 1249 (Sen. Thomas
Kuchel), 1293 (Sen. Sam Ervin in opposition), and 1296 (Sen. Edward Kennedy).
Opponents of the bill also commented upon the effects of the CRA's internal jurisdic-
tion. In a seriatim review of the proposed legislation, South Carolina's Sen. Olin Johnston
offered a common viewpoint when he stated:
In my opinion, title VII ... is one of the worst sections of the bill....
Title VII sets up an [EEOC] to police and investigate all industries affecting
commerce, which includes any activities, business or industry in commerce, and
all persons, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal represent-
atives, joint stock companies, trusts, unincorporated associations, trustees ...
and even churches. The wide range [sic] exercised in this title will affect vir-
tually everyone doing business in the United States limited in its scope only by
the exclusion of businesses hiring small numbers of people ....
STATUTORY HISTORY 1410-11 (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2018 (1963).
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yond the original context, however, it cannot be concluded that these
comments indicate a conscious decision to narrow the scope of the legis-
lation's application.
The phrase "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce" is
laden with complexities. The definition of the term "person" was seem-
ingly designed to include every conceivable legal entity, from labor un-
ions to trustees in bankruptcy," and surely is broad enough to encom-
pass the legal organizational structure of a large number of multination-
als .3 However, again it is unclear whether this .was intended.
The definitions of the terms "commerce" and "industry affecting
commerce" address more directly the issue of international jurisdiction.
"Commerce" is defined by the CRA as "trade, traffic, commerce, trans-
portation, trAnsmission, or communication among the several States; or
between a state and any place outside thereof.. ."I' Not all industries
are in "comriherce." Some industries are wholly contained within a sin-
gle state and do not even rise to the constitutional level of commerce
"among the several States; or between a state and any place outside
thereof.'39 While this provision in the CRA indicates an intention to
cover at least some commercial enterprises involved in international
exchange, it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended to assert
jurisdiction over the foreign operations of all multinational enterprises.
There is some additional evidence, however, that Congress did intend
to reach the donstitutional limit of the Commerce Clause in the separate
definition given the phrase "industry affecting commerce." The phrase
is defined as being either: "any activity, business, or industry in com-
merce ... o industry 'affecting commerce' within the meaning of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act [LMRDA] .... -
This suggests that Congress intended CRA coverage to be at least as
broad as that of the LMRDA. Although the possibility remains that the
Congress was simply inserting a boilerplate designed to invoke its nor-
mal territorial constitutional authority, the legislative history of the
CRA's "commerce clause" argues in favor of the former interpretation.
36. CRA § 701(a):
"[Pierson" includes one or more individuals, governments, governmental
agencies, pdlitical subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corpora-
tions, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts,
unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
Note that the definition of "employer" itself includes the phrase "any agent of such a
person." Thus, an agent of a covered employer is also covered.
37. See generally TINDALL, supra note 2. See also note 34 supra.
38. CRA §701(g) (emphasis added).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(3).
40. CRA § 701(h) (emphasis added).
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The key sponsor of the statute in the House, Judiciary Committee
Chairman Emmanuel Celler, said in debate:
Title VII covers employers engaged in industries affecting commerce,
that is to say, interstate and foreign commerce and commerce within the
District of Columbia and the possessions.4
Similar remarks were made by other members.2
The strongest argument in favor of allowing the CRA to apply abroad
rests, ironically, on an exemption provision in the Act43 which states in
part, "This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to
the employment of aliens outside any State . . . ."" The legislative
history is silent on this section." However, it is clear from the language
that this exemption applies only to the employment by covered employ-
ers of aliens abroad. It does not apply directly to the employment of
aliens in the United States nor to the employment of Americans abroad.
More important for our purposes is the logical implication of this ex-
emption. The fact that the Act expressly excludes only aliens working
41. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3091 (emphasis added).
42. Senators Clark and Case, the floor leaders of the House-approved H.R. 7152, sub-
mitted an "Interpretive Memorandum on Title VII" into the Congressional Record on
April 8, 1964. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3039. It stated, in pertinent part:
"Commerce" is, generally speaking, interstate commerce, but includes commerce
within U.S. possessions and the District of Columbia. It is, in short, that com-
merce to which the regulatory power of Congress extends under the Constitution,
a familiar concept which has been employed in other Federal statutes. The term
"affecting commerce" is also familiar, since this is the standard of coverage em-
ployed in the National Labor Relations Act, 29 United States Code 152 (6),(7),
and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 United
States Code 402(c).
See also opinions on the constitutionality of the Act expressed by various individuals and
organizations inserted into the Congressional Record. Id. at 3075-91. Cf. Note, Title VII:
How To Break The Law Without Really Trying, 21 CATH. U. L. REv. 103 (1971).
43. CRA § 702.
44. CRA § 703.
45. "According to the records, the measure was considered and debated by the House
Judiciary Committee 22 days, by the Rules Committee seven days, by the House six days,
and by the Senate 83 days. The extended debate in the Senate lasted 534 hours, 1 minute,
and 37 seconds." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 11. In that entire debate § 702, the exemption
clause, received no more than passing attention. The language was apparently borrowed
from the original Powell Bill of 1950:
Sec. 4. This Act shall not apply to any employer with respect to the employment
of aliens outside the continental United States, its Territories and possessions.
Fair Employment Practices Act, H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reported out of
the Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP. No. 1165, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
Although there was no reported discussion of the exemption provision in the original
Powell Bill, the McConnell Bill, which was substituted for the Powell Bill by the House
on Feb. 23, 1950, did not include an exemption clause.
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for covered employers abroad logically implies its inclusion of Ameri-
cans working for covered employers abroad. If Congress intended to
exempt all discrimination by American employers "outside any State,"
complete silence on the question would have been stronger evidence of
such a Congressional intent.
Furthermore, there is no jurisdictional problem under international
law raised by a construction of the CRA which concludes that the
American employees abroad of American employers are covered. In
those instances where the parent multinational is either American-
based or staffed with Americans, the basis for the assertion of this type
of prescriptive jurisdiction is most clear. In Skiriotes v. Florida," there
was a confluence of two long-recognized independent bases for extrater-
ritorial prescriptive jurisdiction: nationality and the protective princi-
ple.4" In Skiriotes the Supreme Court held that it was within the power
of Florida to forbid a certain kind of sponge diving by its citizens, de-
spite the fact that the conduct took place just beyond the state's terri-
torial waters. The Court concluded:
Thus, a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly injurious to
the government, and are capable of perpetration without regard to par-
ticular locality, is to be construed as applicable to citizens of the United
States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there be no
express declaration to that effect."8
Although the injury caused by the discrimination against American citi-
zens abroad is less tangible than a citizen's stripping the ocean floor of
sponge, it is no less directly injurious or less directly related to a culpa-
ble national. Employment discrimination makes for inefficient alloca-
tion of human resources, as work assignments by definition are not job-
related where there is discrimination.49 In addition, there is an adverse
psychological impact on the discriminated-against group at home. The
social goal of upward mobility is set back, as is the related goal of oppor-
tunity. This is due in part to the fact that in multinational enterprises
foreign assignment is often a prelude to advancement at home. Finally,
discrimination against minority workers explains, at least in part, their
disproportionately high unemployment rate, and the problem of unem-
ployment among American minorities has been "inextricably linked"
with civil disorders in American cities."
46. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 7 (1965).
48. 313 U.S. at 73-74.
49. Cf. discussion of the Griggs case in the text accompanying note 20 supra.
50. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 231 (1968).
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Thus, where the staff of the multinational are American or the parent
corporation is American, the nationality principle gives ample basis for
an exercise of either criminal or civil jurisdiction. Where this is not the
case, the protective principle still permits the United States to forbid
external acts which cause internal harm. Finally, there is an additional
basis for jurisdiction, not universally recognized, under which a state
may impose a penalty for injury to one of its nationals living abroad.
This may also provide a basis for jurisdiction."
Therefore, although the CRA's legislative history is unclear on the
question of its applicability to the foreign operations of covered employ-
ers, and the language of the statute's general provisions does not explic-
itly forbid its foreign application, the existence of an exemption clause
for aliens abroad does indicate that Americans abroad working for cov-
ered employers are covered. In addition, there does not appear to be any
barrier in international law preventing extraterritorial application of the
CRA. Certainly at the time of the CRA's passage there was every reason
to believe Congress thought it was exercising all of its constitutional
commerce power and that such power would cover American employers
home and abroad. At the very least, then, there is a colorable case for
the extraterritorial application of the CRA.
B. CASE INTERPRETATION
There is no case law exactly on point, but in Espinoza v. Farah Manu-
facturing Co. 52 the Supreme Court considered the significance of the
exemption clause and drew an inference from it in much the same way
as proposed above. The Court held that Title VII "was clearly intended
to apply with respect to aliens inside any State, 5 3 because the exemp-
tion clause excluded only external aliens. The action was initiated by a
Mexican citizen's complaint of discrimination on the basis of national
origin against a southwest textile manufacturer who refused to hire her.
The Court held that the manufacturer's exclusion of the plaintiff alien
from employment did not constitute discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin in light of the employer's substantial number of Mexican-
American employees. Discrimination on the basis of alienage, the Court
ruled, was not prohibited by the CRA. As the Court said:
We agree that aliens are protected from discrimination under the Act.
That result may be derived not only from the use of the term "any
51. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF Punuc INTERNATONAL LAW (2d ed. 1973).
52. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
53. Id. at 95.
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individual" in § 703, but also as a negative inference from the exemption
in § 702, which provides that Tit. VII "shall not apply to an employer
with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State. . . ." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1. Title VII was clearly intended to apply with respect
to the employment of aliens inside any State.
The question posed in the present case, however, is not whether aliens
are protected from illegal discrimination under the Act, but what kinds
of discrimination the Act makes illegal.5
Just as the Court drew a negative inference from the exemption clause
that aliens in the United States are covered, one may similarly infer
from the exemption of aliens abroad that Americans abroad are in-
cluded within the statutory provisions.
C. ANALOGOUS STATUTES
There are several federal statutes which are similar in nature to the
CRA. They also seek to regulate employer-employee relations, have ac-
knowledged wide domestic application, and are administered by spe-
cialized administrative agencies. By studying how the courts have ap-
plied these statutes abroad we can gain clues as to how the courts will
interpret the CRA.
One such statute, the Labor Management Relations Act,55 is the cor-
nerstone of modern American labor relations. Yet, while the Supreme
Court has recognized that the Congress has the power to extend the
jurisdiction of the Act beyond the territorial limits of the United States,
it has been firm in its opinion that Congress has not done so." The Court
said in McCulloch 7 that Congress had not demonstrated the requisite
54. Id. Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion, the Court made reference to an EEOC
General Counsel Opinion Letter which "was addressed to the question whether it was
lawful to discriminate against nonresident aliens in favor of citizens and against resident
aliens, and expressly reserved any decision 'regarding discrimination in favor of United
States citizens and resident aliens." EEOC General Counsel's Opinion Letter, 1 CCH
EMPLOYMENT PRAc. GUIDE 1220.20 (1967), referred to in 414 U.S. 86, 94 n. 7 (1973). On
the assumption that this opinion and several others might contain further interpretive
material on the exemption clause, an attempt was made to obtain a copy from the Office
of General Counsel of the EEOC. The attempt was unsuccessful. The Commission stated
that it does not have a copy of its opinion letter relied upon by the Supreme Court, nor of
several other related opinion letters. Letter from Constance L. Dupre, Acting Associate
General Counsel, Legal Counsel Division, EEOC, Nov. 18, 1975, on file at the Cornell
International Law Journal Office.
55. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRA].
56. See generally Goldberg, Labor Relations and Labor Standards for Employees of
United States Enterprises Working in Foreign Areas, 48 N. DAKOTA L. Rzv. 23, 24-28
(1971); Comment, supra note 27, at 55-62, 65-69.
57. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
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"clear" intent in the LMRA55 and that the protections of the LMRA
therefore did not extend to American sailors aboard "Panlibhon"-
registered American-owned merchant vessels.59 This holding, however,
does not necessarily mean that the Court would not interpret the CRA
as protecting the American employees of certain American employers
working abroad. While the "commerce clauses" of the two statutes are
virtually identical," the existence of the CRA exemption clause might
well supply the necessary explicit language indicating the Congressional
intention absent in McCulloch.
Another analogous statute is the "Eight Hour Law,"'" which provides
that all government contracts shall contain clauses stating that no em-
ployee shall be permitted to work more than eight hours in any one
calendar day. 2 In the case of Foley Bros. v. Filardo,63 as in McCulloch,
the Supreme Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the statute did not
extend to an American employee working for an American employer
outside the United States." The Court again premised its conclusion on
the absence of any evidence in either the Act or its legislative history
that Congress "entertained any intention other than the normal one,"
that Congress was primarily concerned with "domestic conditions."65 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court also relied on the fact that the history
of the Act revealed affirmative Congressional concern with the domestic
labor situation and on the fact that administrative interpretations of the
Act provided "no touchstone by which its geographic scope can be
determined." 6 The Court seemed particularly impressed by the fact
that the President had declared its application suspended at times in
the past. The Court said:
58. Id. at 22.
59. Note, Panlibhon Registration of American-Owned Merchant Ships: Government
Policy and the Problem of the Courts, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 711 (1960); Comment, supra note
27, at n.9.
60. Compare the CRA "commerce clause," text accompanying note 38 supra, with the
LMRA "commerce clause," 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1970).
(6) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or
any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia. ...
See also notes 41 & 42 supra.
61. The Work Hours Standard Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326 (1974).
62. 40 U.S.C. § 324 (1974).
63. 336 U.S. 281 (1948).
64. The employee in Foley Bros. was working in both Iraq and Iran. The Court carefully
steered away from reaching any decision as to the "precise geographic coverage of the
Eight Hour Law." Id. at 286, n.2.
65. Id. at 285.
66. Id. at 288.
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The scheme of the Act itself buttresses our conclusion. No distinction is
drawn therein between laborers who are aliens and those who are citizens
of the United States. Unless we were to read such a distinction into the
statute we should be forced to conclude, under respondent's reasoning,
that Congress intended to regulate the working hours of a citizen of Iran
who chanced to be employed on a public work of the United States in
that foreign land. Such a conclusion would be logically inescapable al-
though labor conditions in Iran were known to be wholly dissimilar to
those in the United States and beyond the control of this nation. An
intention so to regulate labor conditions of a foreign country should not
be attributed to Congress in the absence of a clearly expressed purpose."
The interpretations of these and other analogous statutes indicate,
then, that the Court has been reluctant to assert a statute's jurisdiction
extraterritorially without explicit instructions to that effect from the
Congress. 8 At the same time, however, it is also clear that the Court
looks to the legislative history and administrative interpretation as well
as the actual language of the statute in order to ascertain the intent of
Congress. 9 Applying these factors to the case at hand, the possibility at
least exists that the CRA has extraterritorial application.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
The CRA is the subject of constant litigation, interpretation and anal-
ysis. 0 It should come as no surprise that the question of the jurisdiction
67. Id. at 286.
68. See generally Goldberg, supra note 56.
69. The Court has also treated civil rights statutes with particular sensitivity in our
recent history. This may be an important factor in any decision the Court might reach
regarding the CRA. E.g., in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commission v. Continental Air
Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963), the Court was faced with a state civil rights statute which had
been applied across state boundaries to a black applicant for a position as a Continental
pilot. The Supreme Court of Colorado had found this exercise of authority to be an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. In reversing the Colorado court, Mr.
Justice Black, for a unanimous Supreme Court, said, in passing:
The obvious importance of even partial invalidation of a state law designed to
prevent the discriminatory denial of job opportunities prompted us to grant cer-
tiorari.
372 U.S. at 717. The substance of this case is not entirely different from what one might
expect to find in the controversy which brings the issue of the extraterritorial application
of the CRA before a federal court.
70. The EEOC's current backlog of employment discrimination complaints is 106,700.
The EEOC estimates that the backlog will increase to between 114,300 and 150,000 by
fiscal year 1977. 197 BNA DAILY LAB. REP. A-3 (Oct. 9, 1975). At the same time, a sharp
upturn in United States foreign business has been predicted for this decade, Rhodes,
Upturn in Foreign Activity by U.S. Business, 8 COLuM. J. WORLD Bus. 19 (1973), resulting
in a growing labor force abroad.
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of the CRA over American employees of covered multinationals has
generated several official Justice Department position papers and
EEOC Opinion Letters. These letters, prepared by the EEOC Office of
General Counsel, do not have the force of law but do reflect the position
of the primary administrative agency charged with enforcing the CRA."1
The Supreme Court has relied on these Opinion Letters on occasion to
demonstrate the absence of consistent administrative interpretation of
a CRA provision." In addition, various large employers have taken posi-
tions on the foreign application of the CRA. For example, the American
Telephone & Telegraph Company, which has had more than its share
of dealings with the CRA,13 is of the opinion that the Act applies to its
American employees abroad. 4 On the other hand, the International
Business Machines Company, when asked whether it believed the CRA
applied abroad, reflected a more widespread business community senti-
71. The Justice Department has greater primacy than usual because it was originally
the agency charged with interpreting the CRA.
72. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
73. In 1973, the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, hereinafter cited as
AT&T, signed an agreement with the EEOC costing more than $50-million to wipe out
vestiges of past discriminatory practices in employment. CCH LAB. L. REP., EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES (extra ed. 1973); Equal Employment Opportunity Agreement between the
AT&T Co. and EEOC and U.S. Dept. of Labor (Jan. 18, 1973) [hereinafter cited as AT&T
Settlement]. The original cost of the settlement was reported at $38-million; $15-million
in back pay and $23-million a year in raises. After the agreement was signed the cost
estimate was pushed up to $50-million by new predictions as to the number of employees
who would come forward. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1973, at 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1974, at
36. The vestigal discriminatory practices referred to in the agreement included exclusion
from consideration for certain jobs on the basis of sex, the use of equally-biased criteria
for certain promotions, and different pay scales for men and women for identical work.
Pati & Fahey, Affirmative Action Program: Its Realities and Challenges, 24 LAB. L. J. 351,
358-59 (1975). The payments were made to employees who had been potentially excluded
from consideration for various job opportunities on the basis of their sex. Payments took
the form of lump sum distributions of between $100 and $400. Approximately 15,000
employees were affected. The agreement, however, also provides for the development of
goals and time tables for increasing minority and female representation in the company's
ranks. See AT&T Supplemental Bias Order, 8 BNA LAB. R L. REP., FEP MAN. 431:124a.
"The $15-million back pay will constitute, by far, the largest such settlement ever made.
Several settlements around $1-million had been made earlier." N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1973,
at 1. Since the signing of the above agreement, however, the steel industry has agreed to
what may be an even larger settlement. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1974, at 1; 8 BNA LAB. REL.
REP., FEP MAN. 431:72a. $30.94-million was awarded collectively to 40,000 employees. In
addition to back pay, this agreement, between 9 major steel companies, the United Steel-
workers Union, and the Department of Justice, includes goals and time tables for hiring
minorities and females, and a revised seniority system.
74. Letter from F.J. Peters, Personnel Manager-EEO Policy & Compliance, AT&T,
to Harold Levy, Dec. 17, 1975, on file at Cornell International Law Journal Office.
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ment when it responded: "IBM does not.""5
The Department of Justice has issued repeated opinions on the matter
in the form of written statements delivered before congressional
committees. In 1975, in response to a legislative proposal by Reps. Eliza-
beth Holtzman and Peter Rodino to prohibit "economic coercion" based
on religion, race, national origin, sex, and certain other factors," An-
tonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, testi-
fied before Congress:
[T]he [CRA] contains an exemption "with respect to the employment
of aliens outside any State," which implies that it is applicable to the
employment of United States citizens by covered employers anywhere in
the world.7
The proposed legislation, aimed at undermining the Arab boycott of
firms doing business with Israel or employing "Zionists, 78 was opposed
75. Letter from G.Y. Poetto, IBM Corporate Information, Armonk, N.Y., to Harold
Levy, Oct. 27, 1975, on file at Cornell International Law Journal Office.
76. H.R. 5246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
77. Statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, before the Subcommittee
on Monopolies and Commercial Law, House Committee on the Judiciary, July 9, 1975
[hereinafter cited as Scalia].
Perhaps part of the reason why so few employers seem to be aware of the CRA's applica-
tion abroad is that Scalia's statement was not reported in either the popular press or in
the international trade publications. Cf. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1975; Antitrust: Justice
Opposes Holtzman Bill to Penalize Arab Inspired Economic Boycott, 64 ITEX E-4 (July
15, 1975). Interestingly, while ITEX reported Congresswoman Holtzman's statement that
the antitrust laws might be broadened through judicial interpretation to cover discrimina-
tory secondary boycotts, Scalia's testimony was merely summarized as "opposition" to
the bill. See also Testimony of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce, HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Mar. 13, 1975 (on the Legal Issues Under Civil Rights and Antitrust Laws Regard-
ing the Arab Boycott); Testimony of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Information and Individual Rights, HousE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Apr. 9, 1975 (on Federal Civil Rights Laws Relating
to Overseas Assignments); Testimony of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance, SENATE COMM. ON BANKINO,
HOUSING AND URBAN AAreS, July 22, 1975 (on Amendment No. 24 to S.425 and S. 953).
78. The importance of the Arab Boycott in an economic sense has only become manifest
since the recent influx of "petrodollars" to the Arab countries. Trade between the United
States and the Middle East, for example, has risen from $1-billion in 1971 to a predicted
$7-billion this year. Bus. WEEK, May 26, 1975, at 38. Despite the increase in the boycott's
potential effectiveness, however, whether it has been aimed at Jews or Zionists has re-
mained the object of much controversy. Bender, Arab Attempts to Influence Dealings
With Jews Stirs Furor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1975, at 43, col. 3. A statistical study prepared
by the Beirut-based "Institute for Palestine Studies" on the effectivenss of the boycott
refers only to "Zionist" activities. A. SHARIF, A STATISTICAL STUDY ON THE ARAB Boycorr
OF ISRAEL (1973). Nonetheless, various Jewish groups have been vigorous in their charges
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by the Department of Justice as unnecessary with respect to its impact
on American employment policies both at home and abroad. 9 In de-
scribing the practical effects of the bill, the Department spokesman
indicated that it would make "no discernible change" in the current
law, which already covers American employers abroad with regard to
their American employees." Thus, the Department of Justice found the
bill, directed at economic coercion on American employers in their em-
ployment policies abroad, unnecessary in large part"1 because the prob-
lem is already covered by the CRA. It is worth noting that the legislation
subsequently passed apparently does not directly address the problem
of MNE employment discrimination abroad."2
Finally, there is the EEOC's position as to whether the Act it adminis-
ters has any extraterritorial effect. The opinion of the Commission is
particularly important on the issue of extraterritorial application be-
cause the Supreme Court has said that the EEOC's opinion must be
of anti-semitism. N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1975, at 43. Determining precisely at whom the
boycott is aimed is complicated by the fact that each Arab nation has a variation on the
boycott list. 78 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1975, at 65. Even President Ford and
the State Department have separately expressed concern about "reports that it (the
boycott) could be used for discrimination on outright religious grounds," 72 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 451, 452 (1975). The fact that the boycott is not strictly complied with, even by the
Arab governments themselves, also makes for confusion. Wash. Post, May 18, 1975, at 2.
It can be seen that the fact that the boycott has been conducted in a somewhat haphazard
manner makes a conclusion that it is aimed against Jews, rather than Zionists, proble-
matic. The most helpful discussion of the boycott's true target is Guzzardi, Jr., That
Curious Barrier on the Arab Frontiers, 92 FORTUNE, July, 1975, at 82.
79. Scalia 18 et seq. Although the Scalia statement seems to blur the distinction, it is
worth bearing in mind that the CRA goes only to the employment of Americans abroad,
not the employment of aliens by American employers abroad.
80. Scalia 18 et seq.
81. Scalia did not oppose the entire bill since the Justice Department explicitly en-
dorsed making "coercion to discriminate" also a violation of the law.
I may note that the single substantive provision of the bill which we support,
we support not as a response to the Arab boycott: The prohibition of coercion to
discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, national origin or sex seems to us a
sound addition to domestic civil rights law, Arab boycott or no. It would have the
effect, however, of providing a clear remedy against some of the most obvious
practices alleged to have resulted from the boycott, whereby various firms have
supposedly been pressured to discriminate among their suppliers, customers or
even officers, on the basis of religion. It will not reach such pressure exerted by
Arab governments themselves, but I know of no way to achieve that result except
at the inordinate cost of a provision like subsection (b) [of the Holtzman-Rodino
Bil].
Scalia 22.
82. See 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1976); 50 App. U.S.C. § 2403(a)(2) (1974). See also Arab
Secondary Boycott, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 94 (1976).
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given "great deference" by the courts.0 The conclusion reached by two
successive EEOC General Counsels is that the CRA does apply abroad.
In a letter to Senator Frank Church, dated March 5, 1975, EEOC Gen-
eral Counsel William A. Carey said that Congress had intended to make
Title VII applicable to American citizens employed by American com-
panies operating overseas. 4
Giving Section 702 [the exemption clause] its normal meaning would
indicate a Congressional intent to exclude from the coverage of the
statute aliens employed by covered employers working in the employers'
operations outside of the United States.8
The General Counsel's Opinion Letter carefully traces the basis for con-
gressional authority to assert jurisdiction abroad and concludes that the
rules of statutory construction developed by the Supreme Court require
that the CRA be interpreted as applying abroad.
The reason for such exclusion is obvious; employment conditions in
foreign countries are beyond the control of Congress. The section does
not similarly exempt from the provision of the Act, U.S. Citizens [sic]
employed abroad by U.S. employers. If Section 702 is to have any mean-
ing at all, therefore, it is necessary to construe it as expressing a Congres-
sional intent to extend coverage of Title VII to include employment
conditions of citizens in overseas operations of domestic corporations at
the same time it excludes aliens of the domestic corporation from the
operation of the statute."
This Opinion Letter corresponds almost verbatim with one recently is-
sued by EEOC General Counsel Abner W. Sibal, pursuant to a Freedom
of Information Act request.87
While there has been no authoritative court interpretation of the
CRA, there appears to be a substantial possibility that the Act will be
applied abroad in view of both the consistent administrative
83. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).




87. Letter to Harold Levy from Abner W. Sibal, EEOC General Counsel, Nov. 12, 1975.
Accord, Letter from Constance L. Dupre, supra note 54. The Dupre Letter also made
explicit the fact that the EEOC was of the position that the CRA applied only to American
employers' foreign operations:
Finally, you ask the position of the Commission with regard to the applicability
of Title VII to the alien employers who recruit in this country. Title VII is applica-
ble to the operations in the U.S. of alien employers. It is not applicable to their
foreign opeations, even with regard to employees recruited in the U.S.
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interpretations by the agencies most directly involved in the Act's en-
forcement and the evident congressional intent expressed in the body of
the statute.Y In order to weigh the significance of this conclusion the
implications of the Act's foreign application must be examined.
III
IMPLICATIONS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
The fact that American MNEs are so politically and financially pow-
erful means that any across-the-board change in the enforcement of
statutes applicable to such enterprises will have far-flung repercussions.
Although these consequences may not directly influence a court's deci-
sion on whether to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction under the CRA,
they will surely affect Congress' judgment in deciding whether to amend
the statute. They will also affect the business practices of MNEs, the
policies of host governments, and the general business climate in the
United States.
The degree to which extraterritorial enforcement of the CRA would
benefit individuals abroad is somewhat uncertain. No statistics are
available as to either the number of American citizens abroad working
for American-based employers or the number of discrimination com-
plaints received by the EEOC from American citizens employed abroad
by United States employers."s However, it is known that the EEOC has
received such complaints in the past." In addition, the number of citi-
zens abroad who are not employees of a government, not self-employed,
and not dependents of government employees was over 60,000 in 1970.1'
88. The existence of an available statute minimizes the need for additional legislation,
at least with regard to American employees, which was so vigorously advocated by Dehner,
Jr., Multinational Enterprise and Racial Non-Discrimination: United States Enforcement
of an International Human Right, 15 HARv. INT'L L.J. 71 (1974).
89. Neither the Bureau of the Census nor the Departments of Commerce or Labor have
these employment figures. On the matter of the EEOC complaints, the Dupre letter, supra
note 54, indicated no figures were available.
90. Letter from Constance L. Dupre, supra note 54.
91. See Table 25, Economic Characteristics of "Other Citizens" Abroad . . . 1970,
Bureau of the Census, Americans Living Abroad, Subject Reports, (1970) PC(2)-10A at
103. There were 61,036 United States citizens working abroad for "private employers."
What proportion of these employers was American is unknown. It is likely, however, that
many were employed by American-based multinationals. Franko, Who Manages the Mul-
tinational Enterprises, 8 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 30 (1973).
The ethnic breakdown of United States citizens working for American employers abroad
is also difficult to determine. There are a total of 70,000 United States citizens abroad
who are neither working for the United States nor dependents of someone working for the
United States. This figure includes United States citizens working for foreign governments
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While this number is not large in comparison to the total number of
employees of American-based multinationals around the world,9" it does
represent potentially significant legal liability which cannot be ig-
nored.93
A. THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
Extraterritorial application of the CRA holds implications for MNEs
in both the affirmative action and the business planning areas. Affirma-
tive action is, generally speaking, a wholly domestic concept. It is pri-
and those who are self-employed. The demographic characteristics of this larger group
may well reflect the characteristics of the subset of American employees of American
employers:
68,200 white 50,000 male
1,800 other 20,000 female
In addition, the median years of schooling received is 16.3 years. Only 10% did not finish
high school. Table 30, Social and Occupational Characteristics of Employed "Other Citi-
zens"A broad... 1970, Bureau of the Census, supra, at 144.
92. In 1970 the Commerce Department issued the results of a survey showing that the
298 responding majority-owned foreign affiliates employed 5-million people around the
world. This was up almost 28% from the 1966 benchmark figure of 3.9-million persons.
"While the universe of United States foreign direct investors is not covered, the sample,
which comprises a significant segment of the larger firms, does give a relatively accurate
impression of the situation in 1970." The names of the surveyed firms were compiled from
various national lists of the largest corporations and from those corporations filing
quarterly reports with the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This latter group includes those
businesses "who had financial transactions of more than $500,000 with their foreign affili-
ates." BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL SURVEY OF U.S.
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES, 1970 (Nov. 1972).'See also U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, IMPLICA-
TIONS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS FOR WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT AND FOR U.S. TRADE AND
LABOR (1973).
93. E.g., New York City Human Rights Commissioner Eleanor Holmes Norton widely
circulated a memorandum within New York's business community warning abut the
potential legal liability of placing the burden of economic cutbacks on minorities and
women. Her memo said:
The economic risk to employers of large monetary awards to such laid-off em-
ployes [sic] is substantial, and the complications and practical difficulties aris-
ing from remedial orders have a tremendous potential for creating dislocation and
discord.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,1975, at 17.
See also comments on the AT&T settlement by David Copus, head of the EEOC's panel
on AT&T. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1975, at 1, where it was stated, "Employers won't have
any trouble reading between the lines of this settlement. They are threatened if they
discriminate."
Cf., Statement by the National Organization for Women (NOW) on AT&T Settlement,
reported in the N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1973, at 49, calling the award "chickenfeed," com-
pared to the $4-billion that it said was really owed to the company's women employees.
See also AT&T Settlement, supra note 73.
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marily the concern of those employers under court order to remedy past
violations of the CRA and of federal contractors who must have an
affirmative action program as part of their contractual obligations under
a federal executive order. Employers in either of these two categories
must establish goals for hiring and promoting traditionally under-
represented minorities and women, based on the proportion of these
groups in their labor pool. The labor pool varies depending on the job
to be filled." For example, a small factory looking for manual laborers
may be able to set its goals so as to match the ethnic breakdown of the
local community while a major university seeking to fill a faculty posi-
tion in philosophy may be required to use the ethnic breakdown of the
set of all recent philosophy Ph.D.s as its goal.
Application of the affirmative action principle to the foreign opera-
tions of a multinational presumably involves establishing goals based on
the available and qualified American candidates throughout the world.
Aside from the practical difficulties inherent in this venture, it is ques-
tionable whether MNEs will not be tempted to forego having certain
positions designated "for Americans only." Also, the foreign operations
of federal contractors are currently exempt from the affirmative action
requirement under the executive order as recently interpreted. 5 This
might be viewed as support for the position that affirmative action is
inappropriate in the international setting. Nevertheless, the question of
how an affirmative action program for the foreign operations of an
American employer would work certainly deserves further examination.
Business planning consequences may also flow from tl~e application
of the CRA abroad. American-based MNEs may, for exan~ple, consider
locating their bases of operations elsewhere. Although it is difficult to
imagine that the incremental burden imposed by complying with the
CRA will be dispositive of such an important decision, especially in light
of the far more restrictive regulations to which MNEs are subject,"
application of the CRA may become an important factor in deciding
where to locate. This is particularly true if the MNE is, unlike its corpo-
rate ancestors, essentially "stateless,"9 as various modtem theorists
94. James v. Stockham Valves and Fittings, 394 F.Supp. 434, 495 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
95. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(3) (1976).
96. See comments of M.C. Kennedy, Director, Office of Investment Affairs, Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, in THE NATION-STATE AND TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT 71 (Gunneman ed. 1975); the comments of S.H. Rutten-
berg, id. at 72. The proposals at issue there included establishing a Security and Exchange
Commission for investment, i.e., "a screening process from the [government's] point of
view."
97. H. STEPHENSON, THE COMING CLASH (1972); R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1966).
Stephenson makes the point that much of what we now consider mere size and complexity
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have maintained. Admittedly, this position is not universally held." Yet
virtually all commentators agree that MNEs share certain common
goals: profits, security, and flexibility.9 While the importance of the
security afforded an MNE by being American-based should not be un-
derestimated,'1° it is clear that whether an MNE remains in the United
States will depend upon the tradeoff between the sacrifice of flexibility
in such areas as personnel policies and the nature of security and profits
an MNE experiences by remaining in this country. Even without ac-
cepting the statelessness theory and all its ramifications, one must rec-
ognize the occurrence of this balancing process.
The problem of whether an MNE will be influenced to move its base
of operations is distinct from whether it will be influenced in its decision
where to establish affiliates. The possibility exists that the CRA will put
American-based MNEs at a competitive disadvantage for certain
on the part of MNEs is in fact "international integration." Supra at 8.
Governments and public opinion in the industrial countries, comfortably accus-
tomed to think of their countries as bases for international companies operating
abroad, will with increasing force come to realize that they are themselves hosts
to just such companies. As this process develops, one would expect to see social
and political reactions within industrial countries, similar to those which have
been considered immature from politicians in the Third World during the 1960's.
It seems for the moment as if industrial management is the only organism which
has found the capacity to emerge from the restrictive and increasingly irrelevant
chrysalis of the nation state. In due course the pressure will become irresistable
for a basic change in the attitudes of governments and trade unions alike.
Id. at 12, 175.
98. E.g., N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LIMrrS OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 162, 169 (1973); T.
GAINES, MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST ECONOMIC REPORT: U.S. BUSINESS ABROAD 3
(1969).
99. See generally J. BEHRMAN, DECISION CRITERIA FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA (1974); J. BEHRMAN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENTS
(1971); R. BLOUGH, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: ENVIRONMENT AND ADAPTATION (1966); C.
CROSSWELL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TECHNIQUES (1963); J. FAYERWEATHER, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (1969); M. HODGES, MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1974); C. KINDLEGERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD (1969); J. SCHWENDIMAN, STRATEGIC AND LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR THE MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATION (1973); R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD
OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971).
100. Report, 7146-1.21 Disputes Involving U.S. Foreign Direct Investment: July 1, 1971-
July 31, 1975, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Feb. 28, 1974.
"During the last two years alone, there were at least 87 instances of expropriation or
nationalization, intervention, requisition, contract or concession, cancellation or renego-
tiation, and coerced sale [sic]."
Even Neil Chamberlain, an ardent critic of corporate policy making, recognizes, "How-
ever global the scale on which the firm operates, its basic security lies in its relationship
to its home government." CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 98, at 162.
[Vol. 10:87
Civil Rights in Employment
investment opportunities in the future.'' For example, American-based
MNEs may be unable to select employees for assignment abroad due to
the prejudices or predispositions of the host country's business com-
munity. However, the likelihood of the CRA's application being suffi-
cient to tilt the scales of investment decision in light of the host coun-
try's alternative tactics and other relevant factors is, again, most un-
likely.
The MNE might also respond to the CRA's foreign application by
employing fewer Americans abroad. Section 703 of the Act very clearly
exempts aliens abroad from the CRA's coverage, and the employment
and training of local labor is likely both to win favor with the host
government and to provide a larger profit margin.02 There are, however,
two major factors which mitigate against such a reaction by the MNE:
the scarcity of skilled local labor capable of managing an affiliate, and
the psychological predisposition in many American-based MNEs to
employ Americans in positions of authority.03 In addition, some studies
indicate that the number of Americans employed in managerial posi-
tions in an American MNE's foreign operations is a function of that
MNE's relative stage of development.' 4 The burden of compliance with
101. Villanueva, The Case For and Against the Multinationals, 10 CONF. BD. Rc. 61
(1973). Villanueva argues that one positive sign for the future is the spread of competition
among multinationals from different countries. This, he argues, should "inject a healthy
element of choice for developing countries." What is healthy for the host country need not
be healthy for the MNE or the base country, however.
An example of investment opportunities which might be made more difficult as a result
of enforcement of the CRA abroad are the dealings of American-based oil MNEs with the
countries participating in the Arab boycott. But see note 78 supra.
102. Woodroffe, The Social Role of Multinational Enterprises, 10 CONy. BD. REc. 57,
58 (1973). Woodroffe argues that varying local conditions require both decentralized policy
decisions and the utilization of domestic managerial personnel:
Clearly, decisions taken at headquarters should be kept to essentials and local
management should be given wide independence within guidelines laid down by
the center. These guidelines will be the international policies of the company such
as the kind of products the company wants to make and sell, marketing strategies
for international products in contrast to purely local products, the objectives for
yield on capital employed, the policy on local borrowing....
If the majority of the local management are nationals, as they should be, then
it is sheer commercial common sense, since they have a far more intimate knowl-
edge of the country, its customs and its people than the center could ever hope
to attain....
103. See Franko, Who Manages the Multinational Enterprises, 8 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.
30 (1973); Roach, Weighing the Foreign Work Force; U.S. Executives Compare the Per-
formance of their Employees Around the World, 11 CONF. BD. Rc. 6 (1974); U.S. TARIFF
COMMISSION, supra note 92, at 645, 679-80, 682.
104. Franko, supra note 103, at 35:
Surveys of U.S. company staffing practices in Canada, Belgium, the United
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the CRA is unlikely, then, to be sufficient to cause significantly in-
creased displacement of American labor.
Finally, the possibility remains that the MNEs will, as a business
tactic, seek either to have the CRA amended or local enforcement of it
accepted." 5 Given the deeply-held nature of this nation's civil rights
commitment, amendment of the CRA is unlikely. Moreover, there are
signs that in recent years MNEs have become more socially conscious,
as is illustrated by corporate involvement in the effort to overcome world
hunger. 106
With the exception of a minimally diminished competitive stance, the
application of the CRA is likely to have only minor effect on the MNE's
everyday course of business. The major impact remains in the area of
internal personnel administration, and there the effect is presumably no
greater than on the wholly domestic corporation.
B. THE HOST COUNTRY
The host country has economic as well as social interests it wishes to
protect just as the MNE does. To the extent these interests are adversely
affected by the application of the CRA abroad, there is cause for con-
cern. However, the consequences of CRA application for the vast major-
ity of host countries are either neutral in nature or advantageous to
them.
Kingdom, and India have shown that ... eventual fade-out of U.S. managers after
start-up has been typical of U.S. company practice. The authors of these surveys
... reach the same conclusion: the proportion of local nationals who are presidents
or managers of U.S. company manufacturing subsidiaries increases markedly
with the age of the operation....
Expatriates did reappear in command of subsidiaries in those U.S. firms that
followed a strategy of extending a limited product line around the globe....
General managers with supranational responsibility for multi-country regions
were called upon to facilitate the process. No less than 49 of the 170 U.S. firms
generally considered multinational had moved to regional headquarters manage-
ment by 1967.
105. This type of recourse has been conceptualized in the literature as an attempt by
the MNE at controlling the corporate environment, or "external relations." It has been
elevated to an art form, and is apparently considered both legitimate and necessary by
many MNEs. Presumably in the context of adverse legislation it only calls for lobbying.
Cf. Recent reports of political payoff scandals. Gulf Seeks Repayment of Political
Contributions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1976, at 1. See generally Boddewyn & Kapoor, The
External Relations of American Multinational Enterprises, in MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS AND WORLD ORDER 31-32 (G. Modelski ed. 1972), wherein it is stated, "[Elxternal
relations.., is that function of the firm concerned with enlisting the support or negating
the opposition of those nonmarket and macro-managerial collectivities that actually or
potentially affect its existence and prosperity."
106. Hall, Mobilizing the Multinational, 12 CONF. BD. REc. 47 (1975).
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As noted earlier, if the MNE displaces Americans with local labor, the
host government will surely not object. However, if the MNE abides by
the CRA for its American labor force only, a dual personnel system may
evolve. This, however, may have beneficial consequences because it
brings to bear pressure in favor of equality of opportunity.," Some com-
mentators, on the other hand, have maintained that this pressure to
comply with an American business standard is mere "arrogance."', 8
The social effects of CRA application may also be problematic. One
of the most heralded benefits developing countries have to derive from
a multinational is supposedly its managerial expertise.' 9 A certain level
of deference to local custom is also deemed necessary to promote general
efficiency, which American managerial "know-how" alone could not
accomplish."' However, one of the more regular criticisms leveled at
American MNEs is that they "show little tolerance for diversity.' The
Chairman of First National City Bank explained this common host
107. L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD (1973). Proper strat-
egy for the opponents of apartheid, for example, is allegedly something short of insisting
the MNEs refrain from doing business with racist regimes.
Multinationals who argue that they are building bridges are undoubtedly kid-
ding themselves. There is, however, an excellent case for their staying on - as
Trojan horses, which can be used to help black Africans in their political struggle
... [in South Africa]. No locally owned company is ever going to pioneer schemes
like giving blacks equal pay for equal job opportunities with whites, but the
multinationals can be pressured in these directions. This is important for two
reasons. First, it matters that the absolute wages of black Africans get pushed up
as high as possible, since political activities become easier the less one has to
worry about providing for basic needs like food and housing. Second, the
multinationals are much more likely than locally owned companies to get into
well-publicized confrontations with the government on issues like the job-
reservation laws. The more important the companies concerned, the greater their
impact on political awareness both within and without the country ....
The correct strategy for anti-apartheid forces is thus to pressure multinationals
into significantly improving the conditions of their black workers and into con-
frontations with the government.
As long as this racist regime relies on multinationals, it is not entirely master
in its own house.
Id. at 247.
108. Marshall, Legal Limitations on MNC (Multinational Corporation) Activities and
the Problem of Arrogance, THE NATION-STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN
CONFLICT, supra note 96, at 43, 45, 48.
109. Hall, supra note 106.
110. There seems to be a generally recognized concept of the optimal mix of American
"know-how" and "traditional indigenous business practices." Richman & Copen,
Management Techniques in Developing Nations, 8 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 49 (1973).
111. E.g., Ajami, Corporate Giants; Some Global Social Costs, in MULTINATIONAL COR-
PORATIONS AND WORLD ORDER 113, 115 (G. Modelski ed. 1972).
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country reaction as evolving from a fear of exposure to a changing value
system brought on by a new technology."' "The acceleration of change
brought to a community by a world corporation unfortunately tends to
make the old values look even better to many people.""' Socialist com-
mentators describe this phenomenon as a proper reaction to the social
harm caused by America's "economic imperialism.""' To the extent
that a MNE abiding by the CRA is viewed by the host government as
fostering cultural imperialism, social discord, or the like, one conse-
quence of the Act's enforcement will be a heightened level of dishar-
mony between the host government and the MNE."' For example, sepa-
rate treatment of American employees may well offend a local sense of
propriety. Furthermore, the inability to give sufficient deference to local
business practices because of CRA enforcement may have detrimental
effects on the MNE affiliate's efficiency. With required nondiscrimi-
natory treatment of Americans, theoretically a more "optimal" effi-
ciency position might be achieved. However, the extent to which CRA
application will affect production will vary considerably. It should be
remembered in this regard that American employees abroad are gener-
ally highly educated and likely to be filling managerial positions. This
functional distinction may well create an artificial social distinction
between groups such that application of the CRA goes completely un-
noticed.
Finally, host countries have an arsenal of legal tools available to them
to minimize the impact of the CRA. Most importantly, they may simply
deny visas to any disfavored group, such as Jews, Christians, Blacks, or
Whites. Alternatively, they may attempt to forbid enforcement of the
CRA. This would parallel decisions by courts in this country which have
excluded external social policies on the ground that they violate the
public policy of the forum state. For example, in the case of American
Jewish Congress v. Carter,"' a New York State court decided that an
112. Wriston, The World Corporation; A New Weight In An Old Balance, 10 CONF. BD.
REc. 53 (1973).
113. Id. at 56.
114. Sweezy & Magdoff, Notes on the Multinational Corporation, 5 MONTHLY REv. 1-7;
6:1-13 (Oct. and Nov. 1969).
115. Of course breaking down these prejudices may be the natural and proper function
of the Act, even abroad. See discussion of "customer preference" accompanying text of
note 19 supra.
116. 23 Misc. 2d 446, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959). But see South African Airways
v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 64 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup.
Ct. 1970); New York Times Co. v. City of New York, 79 Misc. 2d 1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321
(Sup. Ct. 1974), afl'd, 49 App. Div. 2d 851, 374 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1st Dep't 1975); Herzog,
Conflict of Laws, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 435 (1972); Note, Republic of South Africa's Visa
Policy, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 132 (1972).
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Arab-based MNE company must cease practicing its home country's
discriminatory social policy in New York State. The MNE, following the
established policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, apparently had
sought to recruit only non-Jewish employees in New York. The court
ruled that an applicant's religion could not be a BFOQ under New
York's law, despite the fact that MNE's home country policy actually
required such discrimination. In ringing language the court declared:
This court does not pretend to assert that Saudi Arabia may not do as
it pleases with regard to whom it will employ within the borders of Saudi
Arabia. Nor does this court pretend to say that Aramco [the MNE] may
not hire whom it pleases to conform to its Arab master's voice. What this
court does say is that Aramco cannot defy the declared public policy of
New York State and violate its statute within New York, no matter what
the King of Saudi Arabia says.
If, as perhaps correctly claimed by Aramco, this must result from the
necessity of possible employment in Saudi Arabia, the answer of New
York State is simply - Go elsewhere to serve your Arab master - but
not in New York State. 7
Enforcement of the CRA abroad may well result in outraged judges in
the host country issuing opinions in similar tones when they perceive
violations of their nation's employment policies, thereby disrupting in-
ternational comity."8
In conclusion, some disruption of the normal business routine may be
expected. In host countries which have countervailing social norms, the
equality required by the CRA may be judicially prohibited, or thwarted
by the country's visa policy. Even in those countries where there is only
a countervailing social custom or where the CRA's policies are adminis-
tered in such a way as to gain the host country's enmity, some dishar-
mony may result from CRA application. Whether this discord will have
a measurable impact on the MNE's efficiency or on its ability to com-
pete effectively will vary greatly from country to country and even com-
pany to company.
117. 23 Misc.2d at 448-49, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 221-22 (emphasis in original).
118. One crucial difference would be that New York was dealing with a foreign recruit-
ment policy being imposed on its citizens in New York. The CRA abroad only applies to
Americans. The obverse situation could not happen. In other words, a Saudi judge would
not find himself in a situation where an American MNE had discriminated among Saudis
in order for the MNE to comply with the CRA.
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C. THE UNITED STATES
The United States uses the MNE as a tool in its foreign policy,"' as a
means to facilitate trade,' 5 and, arguably, as a device for foreign social
control.'2 1' It consequently would be disastrous for the United States if
American-based MNEs were to move their operations elsewhere or to
encounter a significant competitive disadvantage either in their current
operations or in seeking out new markets.
Despite the importance of MNEs to the United States, no uniform
policy toward them has emerged.' 2 Rather, the government has devised
a number of ad hoc policies as the need has arisen.' m
There have been, for example, guarantees of their foreign investments,
measures to discourage foreign governments from expropriating them,
application of United States antitrust laws to their activities abroad,
prohibition on trading with selected foreign countries, revised tax laws
applicable to their earnings, and orders that they deploy their financial
resources to accord with United States balance of payments objectives.'
Given this complex array of regulatory hurdles, it is most unlikely that
the single additional requirement of obeying the CRA abroad would be
119. Sweezy & Magdoff, supra note 114; CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 98. Chamberlain
argues that when there is a "conflict of objectives" between host government and base
government, the latter governs the actions of the MNE. The United States has thus used
the MNE directly to implement its foreign policy. Chamberlain cites two examples.
1) When a French subsidiary of an American firm on its own initiative sold 500 trucks to
Communist China the American parent intervened to cancel the order. It did this because
it was compelled to do so under United States law despite the fact that it thereby sub-
jected its French subsidiary to legal action for breach of contract. Id. at 162. 2) In a similar
fashion, Sperry-Rand's working control of a Belgian firm manufacturing farm equipment
enabled the United States to refuse to permit it to export equipment to Cuba. This in fact
caused questions to be asked in the Belgian Parliament "why a company located in an
economically depressed part of the country should be forced to lose the equivalent of forty
days' work for 2,400 workers because of American commercial foreign policy." Id.
120. Domestic and International Business Administration, Department of Commerce,
OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT OBR74-69 (Dec. 1974), at 1:
In 1973 U.S. exports to Western Europe amounted to $21.4 billion, representing
nearly a third of total U.S. sales abroad. Canada remained our largest single-
nation foreign market, with U.S. sales of $15.1 billion. These substantial magni-
tudes reflect the generally high income levels of Western Europe and Canada, as
well as the similarity of their markets to ours.
121. See generally Sweezy & Magdoff, supra note 114; Ajami, supra note 111.
122. Vagts, The United States of America and the Multinational Enterprise, in
NATIONALISM AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 165 (H. Hahlo, J. Smith, R. Wright eds.
1973); TINDALL, supra note 2.
123. TINDALL, supra note 2, at 186.
124. Stevens, Scanning the Multinational Firm, 1971 BUSINESS HORIZONS 54.
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the straw which breaks the camel's back. In the current absence of any
uniform policy governing MNEs, application of the CRA abroad cannot
be objected to on the grounds of possible domestic injury to the United
States.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether the CRA has any extraterritorial application
depends on many factors. The more obvious have been examined here:
statutory construction, legislative history, international law, and eco-
nomic consequences. Although there has not been a flurry of CRA litiga-
tion in the wake of the renewed vigor of the Arab boycott, the answer
to the question of whether the CRA applies abroad is less clear than
many had assumed. Even in the absence of any authoritative court
ruling on the matter, the possibility alone should be reason for concern
to MNEs. It is certainly possible that in the not too distant future the
Court may find that the CRA clause exempting aliens abroad meets the
test of "affirmative intention ... clearly expressed" set out in cases such
as McCulloch, thereby establishing that Americans abroad are covered
by the Act. The existence of this possibility should alert American
MNEs to the potential liability they may incur by inaction and to the
added governmental regulation of their activities which noncompliance
with the CRA may induce.
Harold Levy
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